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1 
1.0 Introduction 1 
From its inception in the 1950s, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 2 
experienced a series of reforms, initially progressing along a pathway of support for 3 
output expansion (Skogstad and Verdun, 2009; Burrell, 2009), in order to address 4 
food security issues arising from the Second World War. However, by the 1980s, 5 
European production was no longer characterised by a deficit in food production, and 6 
the negative environmental and economic impacts of the production surplus were 7 
being recognised (Commission of the European Communities, 1991). Subsequent 8 
reforms have shifted policy away from direct production supports. The “MacSharry 9 
Reforms” in the early 1990s replaced price supports with direct aid payments to 10 
farmers. New policies continued to provide substantial payments to farmers, but 11 
shifted in emphasis towards food quality, supporting farm diversification and 12 
environmental maintenance.  In 2003, the “Fischler Reform” represented a far more 13 
radical shift (Swinnen, 2010), decoupling a large share of the CAP from production 14 
into a ‘single farm payment’ (SFP), and introducing modulation (where funds were 15 
shifted towards rural development) and cross compliance (where only farmers 16 
adhering to a set regulations relating to the environment, animal welfare, livestock 17 
identification and traceability, plant protection and food safety were eligible to receive 18 
the SFP). Further reforms in 2015 have continued to separate farm payments from 19 
production, with the addition of new ‘greening requirements’. Over this time period, 20 
while the budget for the CAP rose (reflecting the increasing number of European 21 
states), in real terms, the funding available at national levels and thus also to 22 
individual farms has declined (European Commission, 2015). The purpose of this 23 
paper is to explore the influence of recent CAP reforms, particularly potential 24 
changes to individual payments, on UK farming trajectories. 25 
*Manuscript without author identifiers
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The changing trajectories of European farms, in response to policy and other shifts, 26 
has been a popular topic of research.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, the potential for 27 
differential development of farms, conceptualised as ‘farm adjustment strategies’ 28 
was explored within modified political economy frameworks (Evans, 2009).  Bowler 29 
(1992) is perhaps best known for identifying a range of possible farming trajectories, 30 
building on a typology by Whatmore et al. (1987).  These seven ‘paths of farm 31 
business development’ included intensification and specialization, recombination of 32 
farm resources into new enterprises and products on and off the farm, maintaining a 33 
traditional model of farming, winding down into hobby or semi-retirement, and 34 
retirement from farming altogether.   35 
The farm adjustment literature was largely subsumed within the post-productivist and 36 
multifunctional agricultural literature of the 1990s and 2000s, which focused on 37 
assessing policy shifts away from production (Marsden and Sonnino, 2008), and 38 
seeking evidence for related transitions at farm level (Gorton et al., 2008; Walford et 39 
al., 2003; Wilson, 2001). More recently, this discourse has shifted towards ‘neo-40 
productivism’, a political discourse oriented towards addressing world hunger 41 
through increased production (Brunori et al., 2013; Burton and Wilson, 2015). In 42 
general, empirical studies have found that European farmers retained a strong 43 
cultural orientation towards production-oriented agriculture (Burton, 2004; Gorton et 44 
al., 2008). At the same time, the differential behaviour of farms were recognised in a 45 
growing number of farm typologies (e.g. Barnes et al., 2011; Bohnet, 2008; Davies 46 
and Hodge, 2007; Garforth and Rehman, 2006; Gorton et al., 2008).  These 47 
typologies generally assumed path dependence (i.e. that farms would continue along 48 
their established trajectories). Farmers have a range of management options which 49 
may constrain or steer them away from the present farming business environment, 50 
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referred to as path dependency (Brian 1994; David, 1985).  In addition, there are 51 
strong cultural orientations embedded in farming, which support the continuation of 52 
production-oriented farming practices in particular (Gray, 1998; Burton, 2004, Burton 53 
et al., 2008). 54 
Recent work has introduced approaches for understanding major transitions at farm 55 
level. Wilson (2007) argued that transition is non-linear, heterogeneous, complex 56 
and inconsistent, and therefore somewhat unpredictable.  His conceptualisation 57 
emphasised key nodal turning points. Sutherland et al. (2012) proposed an 58 
alternative perspective based on empirical research, which similarly identified major 59 
transition processes, but found a smoother level of transition, following ‘trigger 60 
points’ in the farm life cycle where farmers were particularly open to changing 61 
trajectory.  Both were consistent in arguing that farm decision-making is path 62 
dependent, but that these pathways were not inevitable: new directions can be 63 
adopted under particular conditions, but these remain heavily impacted upon by 64 
previous decisions and information held within the farming family, as well as the 65 
opportunities present in the structure of the farm and farm household. Major changes 66 
in farm profitability and subsidy access were included in their list of possible triggers 67 
and nodal points for these major change processes. 68 
In this paper we focus on the changes to production and land use in response to 69 
CAP reforms1. Releasing farmers from the requirement to produce led to a range of 70 
studies focused on the possible response of farmers (Rickard, 2004; Tranter et al., 71 
2007; Sorrentino et al., 2011), with the emphasis on their intentions to reduce 72 
agricultural production (Gorton et al., 2008; SAC, 2008) or to exit from the industry 73 
itself (Breen et al., 2005; Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010).   Generally these studies 74 
                                                          
1
 Farm diversification is the subject of a separate paper based on this dataset. 
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find a strong influence from the CAP on determining activity levels within the 75 
industry.  This is not surprising given the high average proportion of total farm 76 
income which comes from EU support (European Commission, 2014).  Accordingly, 77 
uncertainty from the reform process and future payment rates have been found to 78 
affect decision-making (Dibden and Cocklin, 2005; Lobley and Butler, 2010).    79 
Dissociating the full consequence of CAP reforms from other decision-making 80 
influences represents a substantial challenge. Farmer decision-making is complex: 81 
affected by the whole spectrum of external and internalised social norms, information 82 
provision and regulation (Beal 1996; Hardaker et al., 1997; Ahearn et al., 2005; 83 
Harrington, 2005; Gallerani et al., 2008; Viaggi et al., 2011) and must respond to 84 
uncertainties centred on the weather, economic shocks and disease management 85 
priorities (Binswanger and Sillus, 1983; Backus et al., 1997; Smit and Skinner, 2010; 86 
Barnes and Toma, 2012; Islam et al., 2013). Nested within these uncertainties is the 87 
influence of direct support payments on shifting farm planning pathways. 88 
Nevertheless, over the last decade reforms have led to fundamental shifts in the way 89 
that funding is administered and the recent reforms represent a significant change to 90 
CAP payments.  Uncertainties of policy reform must be disentangled from external 91 
and internal influences which affect farmer decision-making.  92 
Previous studies have attempted to measure farmer-stated intentions under future 93 
and recent reform of the CAP (Tranter et al., 2007; Gorton et al., 2008; Lobley and 94 
Butler, 2010; Morgan-Davis et al., 2012; Latruffe et al., 2013; Raggi et al., 2013).  95 
These have been survey based and tended to focus on present and future pressures 96 
on the industry.  Consequently, agricultural intentions will infer individual farmer 97 
pathways and provide a link to the heterogeneous factors which are specific to 98 
farmer decision-making.  These intentions can focus on increasing intensity or 99 
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expanding present agricultural activity (Breen et al., 2005; Brady et al., 2009; 100 
Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010; Viaggi et al., 2013; Latruffe et al., 2013), extensifying 101 
agricultural land for the generation of other ecosystem services (Schmid and 102 
Sinabell, 2003; Schmid et al., 2007; Bartolini and Viaggi, 2013; Ribeiro et al., 2014), 103 
or even withdrawal from agricultural or land based activity itself (Gallerani et al., 104 
2008; Brady et al., 2009; Mishra et al., 2010; Latruffe et al., 2013; Viaggi et al., 105 
2013).  A series of studies have also examined the intentions related to diversifying 106 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities (Lobley and Potter, 2004; Meert et al., 107 
2005).  To maintain focus and for brevity within this paper we concentrate on 108 
intentions to increase or decrease agricultural production activity.   109 
There is only a limited amount of literature which has aligned specific CAP policy 110 
reform to future intentions and this focuses on the decoupling of payments under the 111 
Fischler Reforms in 2003 (Breen et al., 2005; Gorton et al., 2008; Lobley and Butler, 112 
2010).  However, the reform of the CAP will influence farmer decision making.  The 113 
possible changing levels of subsidy payment from reform will affect farming 114 
intentions and this has tended to remain the domain of economic modelling (e.g. 115 
Moss et al., 2002; Breen et al., 2005) with only a few studies using survey based 116 
methods to understand response to extreme payment scenarios, such as complete 117 
removal of CAP payments (Latruffe et al., 2013; Giannoccaro and Berbel, 2013).  118 
Latruffe et al. (2013) admit that removal of subsidies is a somewhat unlikely scenario 119 
in the short and medium term for the CAP.  Nevertheless, reform will result in a 120 
change to the total amount of direct payment (positively or negatively, on a case by 121 
case basis), rather than complete removal of support per se. 122 
Payments from subsidy will also have an historic ‘lock-in’ effect on determining future 123 
decision making.  For example Gorton et al. (2008) offer evidence from follow-up 124 
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surveys, where actual behaviour matches farmer stated intentions.  Accordingly, 125 
following the discussion above concerning farm pathways, we would expect 126 
responses to past reform to be a predictor of future intentions, as this reflects some 127 
form of policy ‘lock-in’  (Kay, 2003; Wilson, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2012).  Testing 128 
these effects is noticeably absent from the previous literature and this paper extends 129 
this by testing the influence of past reform on future intentions.   130 
In this research we utilise a case study of Scotland, within the United Kingdom. In 131 
2005  Scotland opted for a historically based SFP, with area based entitlement value 132 
determined by average subsidy levels from 2001-2003.  Scotland is shifting to an 133 
area based system under the 2015 reforms, based on land quality criteria.  With an 134 
introduction of single regional payment rates by 2019, intensive farmers would 135 
expect a decline in payment rates.  In addition within the livestock sector some 136 
coupling remained in the 2003 reforms within the beef sector through a Voluntary 137 
Coupled Scheme (VCS) in 2015 this also extends this to the sheep sector in the very 138 
extensively farmed rough grazing region.  As such the 2015 round of CAP reforms 139 
are set to have a greater impact on payment levels to individual farms than the 140 
introduction of the SFP in 2005.  Support payments are a significant part of the 141 
Scottish livestock sector as incomes, without subsidy, are historically negative.     142 
Typically, subsidy levels are around the same as the value of output recorded on  143 
Scottish livestock farms (Scottish Government, 2014).  Consequently changes in the 144 
payment regime and the associated rules, relating to cross-compliance, dictate the 145 
pathways under which these farmers can operate and will add to the uncertainties 146 
within the farmer planning process.      147 
 148 
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The next section outlines the survey instrument, the data collected and describes the 149 
analysis method chosen.  This is applied to the case of livestock farmers within 150 
Scotland.   151 
 152 
2.0  Data and methods 153 
2.1. Data 154 
A telephone-based survey of Scottish agricultural holdings was conducted over the 155 
summer of 2013.  A spatially representative sample of 10,000 holdings was selected 156 
using information from the June Agricultural Survey (JAS) on region, activity, size 157 
and farming enterprise.  For a large scale survey this data source is the most 158 
appropriate as it gives national level coverage and detailed information on activity for 159 
ensuring representativeness, however, like most Government agricultural data, it has 160 
limits in terms of minimum size requirements of holding represented (Scottish 161 
Government, 2012).  Business holdings with less than 0.5 standard labour 162 
requirements are under-represented within the JAS.    163 
Whilst this under representation of ‘very very small’ holdings does not historically 164 
reflect those affected by CAP payment regimes, some reform scenarios for the 2014-165 
2020 period have proposed extending the criteria for eligibility to include these 166 
smaller units (European Commission, 2013).  Consequently, whilst we are confident 167 
that we can capture the majority of producer intentions, there may be some bias with 168 
respect to under representation from farms classified as ‘very very small’.  Notably, 169 
inclusion of these marginal units is also a wider issue for Government and European 170 
data collection agencies were the CAP to increase eligibility for these holdings.  Only 171 
those farms registered as specialist livestock types using the standard farm type 172 
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classifications, namely: ‘Specialist Dairy’, ‘LFA Cattle and Sheep’, ‘Lowland Cattle’, 173 
‘LFA Sheep’ and ‘LFA Cattle’ were chosen for this analysis.  174 
The questionnaire contained a number of sections designed to elicit intentions, 175 
understand past behaviour and the influences on these intentions up to 2020.  The 176 
questionnaire had three main sections, namely: 177 
i) the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the farmer; 178 
ii) changes to the farm since 2005 and perceptions towards the ease of 179 
changing the farm;  and 180 
 iii) proposed intentions for the farm up to 2020.   181 
The study period for changes begins in 2005 to reflect the implementation of the 182 
Fischler Reforms and the shift towards historic payments.  Hence, it provides a 183 
convenient base period for understanding change to past reform but also would be a 184 
reference point for farmers who may have adjusted their strategies to accommodate 185 
these changes in payment requirements.  186 
We focus on the main agricultural and structural activities within the farming sphere.  187 
These are the intentions to increase or decrease agricultural intensity, size of the 188 
herd or the business, the level of family or regular employed labour, decisions 189 
related to renting more or less land, or exiting farming.  Farmers were asked along a 190 
3 point scale whether they intended to decrease, increase or remain stable in terms 191 
of these activities. The question related to the intention to exit the business by 2020 192 
was a yes/no binary question.  193 
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Intentions were elicited under various scenarios up to 2020, for farmers to consider.  194 
Farmers were initially asked their intentions up to 2020, assuming present economic 195 
and policy conditions, including commodity prices and costs, and the continuation of 196 
CAP Pillar 1 payments were at the same level as 2013.  This is referred to as the 197 
Business as Usual (BAU) scenario.   198 
Farmers were then asked the same set of intentions after considering a hypothetical 199 
increase in the annual Pillar 1 payment of 25% compared to their present payment 200 
rate.  Again, this was assuming present economic and other policy conditions were 201 
at the same level as 2013.  This is referred to as the payment increase scenario 202 
(PINC).  Farmers were then asked to consider a hypothetical decrease in annual 203 
Pillar 1 payments of 25% compared to the present payment rates assuming present 204 
economic and other policy conditions were at the same level as 2013.  This is the 205 
payment decrease scenario (PDEC).  The parameter of 25% emerged from farm 206 
level modelling scenarios identifying the expected extent of the impact of CAP reform 207 
on farming sectors within Scotland (see Ahmadi et al., 2014).   208 
It is arguable that farmers can disassociate the full effects of the CAP from other 209 
drivers on their decision making.  However, we follow a similar approach to other 210 
studies which have specified hypothetical scenarios relating to CAP removal and 211 
reform (e.g. Breen et al., 2005; Gorton et al., 2008; Latruffe et al., 2013; Raggi et al., 212 
2013; Giannoccaro and Berbel, 2013).  Also, focusing on Pillar 1 payments, which 213 
contributes to around 70 to 80% of all farm subsidy payments in Scotland, controls 214 
for the majority of these other effects.   215 
The survey yielded 1,764 observations from livestock based holdings.  These were 216 
then matched with JAS data to provide further information on activity levels, such as 217 
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size, economic size units, main activities and regional distribution.  Table 1 shows 218 
descriptive statistics for the main variables matched within the JAS. Statistical 219 
comparison, conducted through t-tests, indicated no significant differences between 220 
key identifiers in the sample and the census. 221 
Table 1.  Survey respondents by NUTS2^ region classification, mean and 222 
standard deviation  223 
 224 
2.2. Estimation strategy 225 
As responses were categorical, a logistic regression approach was applied to the 226 
data.  One intention related to exiting the business and this was handled as a 227 
straight binary variable (y | 0,1), with 1 reflecting the intention to exit.  For the 228 
remainder, the intentions statements were along a 3-point scale (decrease, stay 229 
stable, increase) and multinomial logistic regression was used.  This is appropriate 230 
when categorical responses exceed a binary outcome and are not ordered in any 231 
way.  Hence, in equation 1 let J be the number of nominal outcomes and m the class 232 
of y outcomes, that is, (0) stay the same, (1) increase, and (2) decrease.  Thus, 233 
considering the range of outcomes (y), the predicted probability of the i-th farmer 234 
choosing a nominal outcome (y = 0,1,2) is: 235 
            
  
       
    
        
    
 
   
    (1) 236 
Where β0 = 0 237 
This provides indications of the probability of a change in the independent variable 238 
(x) affecting membership of one of the three classes.  The base outcome class of 239 
staying the same (y=0) was used for referencing the intention to change.  The 240 
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dependant variable was a stated increase in intention relative to staying the same, or 241 
a stated decrease in the intention relative to staying the same.  All explanatory 242 
variables were either binary or categorical.  Categorical responses were converted 243 
into dummy variables and are presented conditional on the reference value specified 244 
in Table 2 below.  All intentions were estimated within this regression framework with 245 
a fixed set of independent variables.  Estimation was conducted within Stata 13.1 246 
(Stata Corp, 2013).   247 
 248 
Table 2. Variables used within the empirical model and distributions 249 
 250 
Past responses to CAP reform are included as a variable for explaining future 251 
intentions.  The reform of the CAP would be expected to be a ‘trigger’ event to 252 
changing path dependency (Sutherland et al., 2012) and we would expect this to 253 
have a significant effect on future intentions.  Furthermore, the hypothetical payment 254 
scenarios were included to estimate the strength of a payment increase or a 255 
payment decrease on a stated intention.  Pillar 1 payments in Scotland are almost 256 
fully decoupled from activity levels, hence these payment rates should, in theory, 257 
have little effect on intention levels.   Breen et al. (2005) found that a sample of Irish 258 
cattle, dairy and tillage farms did not behave rationally with respect to reductions in 259 
payment rates and, in fact, displayed inertia towards changing the business, when 260 
compared with an optimising modelling approach.  Tranter et al. (2007) asked 261 
cropping farmers in the UK, Germany and Portugal their responses to detaching 262 
payments from current land use and also found a similar lack of response to 263 
decoupled payments and changing activity levels.  Nevertheless, some studies 264 
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argue that support payments are ‘partially coupled’ within farmer decision making.  265 
That is, the size of the subsidy will still influence activity rates (Moss et al., 2002; 266 
Lobley and Butler, 2010).  Accordingly, including these variables would give an 267 
estimate of the parameter effects of how these payment rates affect the robustness 268 
of the planned intention.   269 
The age of the farmer is a typical variable in most studies of farmer decision making 270 
and these tend to find that younger farmers will be more innovative and seek a 271 
change in the farm business with respect to agricultural expansion and associated 272 
activities (Willock et al., 1999; Douarin et al., 2007; Morgan Davies et al., 2012). 273 
Raggi et al. (2013) examined nine EU countries to explore farmer exit strategies and 274 
the determinants of land re-allocation.  They found age to be significant and positive 275 
with respect to exiting the industry but negative with respect to selling the land.  They 276 
argued this latter effect was due to older farmers having a greater emotional 277 
attachment to their land.  Latruffe et al. (2013), using the same scenarios as Raggi et 278 
al. (2013), found similar effects for two regions within France. In addition, being 279 
educated at college level tends to be positively related with respect to increasing 280 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities (Willock et al., 1999; Gorton et al., 2008; 281 
Barnes et al., 2009; Guillem et al., 2012).  We would therefore expect education 282 
levels to be positively related to all activities. 283 
Latruffe et al. (2013) reviewed studies on land ownership and intentions to sell land.  284 
They found a mixed effect, as it may be a consequence of higher farm value which 285 
leads to a higher probability of sale.  Conversely it may allow greater access to 286 
finance and, as a means of sustaining the business, may be less likely to be sold.  287 
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Consequently, this variable is quite context specific and it is difficult to draw general 288 
conclusions from these studies.  289 
The level of regular labour is used to infer the physical and size capacity for change, 290 
as farm labour availability is a significant constraint to expansion of activities, 291 
especially in countries with a high remoteness profile such as Scotland (Stott et al., 292 
2005).  This is because a significant percentage of land is in rough grazing and 293 
therefore of low economic value.  Hence, labour employed, in the Scottish context, 294 
would be a more appropriate indicator of size than other available indicators.   Thus, 295 
whilst Raggi et al. (2013) found increasing land area to lead to less likelihood of 296 
exiting for their study of nine EU countries, a finding which was echoed by Latruffe et 297 
al. (2013) and Giannoccaro and Berbel (2013), land area would not adequately 298 
capture physical capacity within Scotland.   299 
Previous studies have emphasised the importance of farm family life cycles to 300 
maintain or change farming structures (Ilbery, 1978; Gasson and Errington, 1993; 301 
Errington, 1998).  Lobley and Butler (2010) found identification of a successor to be 302 
a determinant of a more positive attitude towards farming in a survey of farmers 303 
within the South-West of England.  These authors emphasise the importance of 304 
inheritance and succession in securing the long-term viability of the farm.  305 
Accordingly, the identification of a successor would, we expect, be positively related 306 
with expanding farm planning trajectories.  307 
Less-Favoured Area (LFA) designation has not been explored in much detail within 308 
studies of future farming intentions.  However, much like the labour variable above, it 309 
infers a biophysical constraint to the options available for farmers.  Latruffe et al. 310 
(2013) found that LFA designation for farms in several French regions led to less 311 
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likelihood of farmers selling their land.  This result reflects the limited demand and, 312 
subsequent value, for land within Less Favoured Areas.  Accordingly, we would 313 
expect that farmers with the majority of their farms within LFA areas would have a 314 
more constrained set of agricultural opportunities and, hence, limit the desire for 315 
change within a business.   316 
Finally, the dairy sector is generally seen as more progressive and intensive 317 
compared to other livestock sectors within Scotland (Barnes et al., 2010; Withers, 318 
2013).  Hence, a dummy variable was used to capture these livestock effects and 319 
reflect specialised activity.  This would, we expect, explain some of the intentions to 320 
increase agricultural activity.  321 
 322 
3.0. Results 323 
 324 
3.1. Descriptives 325 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to the payment scenarios.  These are 326 
summed across each of the hypothetical payment scenarios to give an illustration of 327 
the responses to each intention.  Much like other studies (Breen et al., 2005; Tranter 328 
et al., 2007; Gorton et al., 2008; Lobley and Butler, 2010) the bulk of farmers 329 
indicated no change in activity by 2020.  An average of 70% of farmers expressed 330 
this desire under the business as usual scenario, 72% under a payment increase, 331 
and 66% when payments were reduced.  It seems that, under business as usual 332 
conditions, between 10% to 30% still intend to increase their activities.  The most 333 
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popular activities are to increase the number of livestock and the intensity of their 334 
production.   335 
Figure 1.  Sensitivities of change to payment scenarios, percentage sum by 336 
intention if a) Pillar 1 payments remain the same, b) Pillar 1 payments increase 337 
by 25%, c) Pillar 1 payments decrease by 25% 338 
 339 
The response to the payment scenarios are also shown in Table 3 and calculated as 340 
the percentage difference between the business as usual scenario and the payment 341 
increase or payment decrease scenarios.  An additional 29% of farmers would 342 
increase the size of their business if payments were to increase.  An additional 15% 343 
would increase their amount of livestock and 13% would intensify their business.  344 
Moreover, an additional 15% of farmers stated they would employ more regular 345 
labour under a payment increase.   346 
 347 
Table 3.  Sensitivities of response to payment scenarios relative to Business 348 
as Usual, percentage by intention if a) Pillar 1 payments increase by 25% or b) 349 
Pillar 1 payments decrease by 25% 350 
 351 
A reduction in Pillar 1 payments would lead to around half of the farmers surveyed 352 
stating an intention to decrease their livestock numbers and 46% of farmers reducing 353 
the intensity of their production.  This equates to an additional 35% to 38% of 354 
farmers intending to decrease their agricultural activities if payments were reduced, 355 
compared to Business as Usual conditions.  An additional 6% of farmers stated a 356 
desire to exit if Pillar 1 payments were to decrease.   357 
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The next series of tables shows the results from the multinomial logistic regressions 358 
with respect to intentions to increase or decrease activity.  Under the final 359 
specifications of the model, a number of variables proved to be highly significant and 360 
allowed correct classification of around 70% of the sample into the three categories 361 
considered (increasing, stable and decreasing activity).  However, the estimates 362 
generated a pseudo R2 of between 0.11 to 0.32, indicating high levels of unobserved 363 
individual heterogeneity within the sample.  Nevertheless, this is common in previous 364 
studies of intentions (Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010; Giannoccaro and Berbel, 2013; 365 
Latruffe et al., 2013).  The explanatory variables were all categorical and, hence, the 366 
exponent of the multinomial logit coefficient was calculated to indicate the relative 367 
risk ratio (RRR) of the effect of a variable on membership of increasing or decreasing 368 
intentions.  The Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) can be read as the effect on the 369 
outcome of a unit change in the predictor variable, given other variables in the model 370 
are held constant.   371 
3.2.  Intentions to exit farming 372 
Table 4 shows the relative risk ratios related to the intention to exit farming by 2020. 373 
Decreasing Pillar 1 payments, increasing age of the farmer and not having identified 374 
a successor are significant variables.   375 
A hypothetical reduction in payment would lead to an additional  6% of farmers who 376 
would probably exit by 2020. Latruffe et al. (2013), applying the more extreme 377 
scenario of CAP removal, found an additional 21% of French farmers in their study 378 
region, above those who stated the desire to exit anyway, would exit farming.  Raggi 379 
et al. (2013) also found a sharp rise in farmers stating a desire to exit, relative to 380 
those exiting anyway, if CAP payments were removed.   381 
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Table 4. Logistic regression model on intention to exit farming, relative risk 382 
ratios 383 
 384 
The intention to exit increases with age and this agrees with Latruffe et al.’s (2013) 385 
study for French farmers. Raggi et al. (2013) in their wider study of 9 EU countries 386 
found similar results.  The final indicator is the identification of a successor which 387 
here is negatively related to exiting the business.  It therefore agrees with the 388 
majority of past studies that find succession to have a positive influence on 389 
remaining in farming (Lobley and Butler, 2010).    390 
We find no effect of labour employed, whereas other studies do find that larger and 391 
medium sized farms are less likely  to exit (Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010; Latruffe 392 
et al, 2013; Raggi et al., 2013).  However, these studies did not use size of the 393 
labour force but tended to focus on area owned.  This latter variable is complicated 394 
by the large areas of rough grazing generally found on Scottish cattle and sheep 395 
farms (Scottish Government, 2014).  Within the Scottish context this is low value, 396 
marginally productive land, and less of a constraint than labour usage. 397 
 398 
3.3. Intentions related to increasing or decreasing agricultural production 399 
Table 5 shows the influence of the range of variables in determining an increase or a 400 
decrease in agricultural activity up to 2020.  Common significant variables are; i) 401 
having responded similarly since past CAP reform, ii) responding positively to a 402 
change in payments, i.e. stating an intention to increase activity when payments 403 
increase or stating an intention to reduce activity if payments decrease, and iii) 404 
having identified a successor for the business.   405 
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Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression model on agricultural intentions by 406 
2020, relative risk ratios 407 
 408 
Both the payment scenarios and response to past reforms are highly significant 409 
toward changing intensity and size of the herd.  Relative risk ratios for increasing 410 
activity, if such activity has increased since the last reforms (RINC), are around 2 to 411 
3 times higher relative to staying the same.  Conversely, relative risk ratios are 412 
around 4 times higher for the intention to decrease activity if activity has decreased 413 
since previous reform (RDEC).  This provides some context for explaining the 414 
findings of previous studies, which identify a reluctance to change under CAP reform 415 
and instead opt for the status quo position (Breen et al., 2005; Tranter et al., 2007; 416 
Gorton et al., 2008; Latruffe et al., 2013).  In addition, this also shows an underlying 417 
inference of the fixity of assets, that is any disinvestment in physical and human 418 
capital is difficult and will lead to a position of protection of erosion of that capital.  419 
Consequently, the farmers surveyed here will be reluctant to change due to these 420 
‘lock-in’ effects. 421 
The response to payment scenarios were included as a set of dummy variables 422 
relative to no change, that is the intention to increase or decrease activity if 423 
payments increase (PI-I; PI-D) and, conversely, the intention to increase or decrease 424 
activity if payments decrease (PD-I; PD-D).  For both intensity of production and 425 
changing the size of herd this seems to infer that there may still be some link 426 
between Pillar 1 payments and agricultural production.  Relative risk ratios are 427 
between 3 to 4 times higher than no change, indicating that changes in payment will 428 
lead to the greater intention to change the business.  This echoes the retrospective 429 
study of hill sheep farms in Scotland (Morgan-Davies et al., 2012) who found that 430 
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farmers had decreased animal numbers in response, in part, to loss of subsidies 431 
from the 2003 regime changes.  Other studies across the EU (Bartolini and Viaggi, 432 
2013; Raggi et al., 2013; Gianncarro and Berbal, 2013) found that reductions in CAP 433 
payments, through removal of payments, tends to reduce the expansionist 434 
tendencies within farmers. This is true here of livestock farmers within Scotland if 435 
payments were to reduce. 436 
Table 6. Multinomial logistic regression model on land and labour intentions 437 
by 2020, relative risk ratios 438 
 439 
Regular employment and land rental based intentions show past policy response is a 440 
significant predictor of future intention.  If farmers had responded to the 2003 reforms 441 
by undertaking these changes on the farm, they are more likely to increase or 442 
decrease this activity under the latest reforms of the CAP, rather than maintain 443 
present structures.  The relative risk ratios are high and significant when intentions 444 
follow the same trajectory, for example increasing activity in the past leads to 445 
intentions to increase activity under new reforms.  However, for some intentions the 446 
converse is also significant, that is if land rental or land contracting activity increased 447 
in the past then this could lead to the intention to decrease activity.  These RRR’s 448 
are lower and less significant but are reflective of the short-term nature of renting 449 
and contracting land in Scotland.  This is determined by seasonal changes in 450 
stocking levels and evidenced by informal arrangements surrounding them 451 
(Thomson et al., 2014).  Moreover, Ward et al (1990) found mixed results of land 452 
ownership arrangements and localised effects on landscape change within five case 453 
studies across the UK.  They suggested that landscape change, reflective of an 454 
intensifying landscape, occurred on land which changed tenure.   The effect on 455 
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regular labour may be evidence of the competing factors that determine farm 456 
household and business structure, in particular, the uncertainty of fluctuating 457 
demand for on-farm labour against household and off-farm labour requirements 458 
(Loughrey et al., 2013).     459 
The two payment scenarios also have mixed responses with respect to labour and 460 
land.  A hypothetical increase in Pillar 1 payments leads to the intention to increase 461 
the level of employed labour, the level of family labour and to rent in more land.  462 
Conversely, a payment increase could also lead to the intention to decrease family 463 
labour.  This latter result may be the effect of higher income support payments 464 
triggering farmers to release family labour from on-farm work to other activities.  465 
Goetz and Debertin (1996) and Petrick and Zier (2011) also found this effect related 466 
to increases in CAP payments.    467 
If payments were reduced this may also trigger an increase or a decrease in the 468 
amount of family labour employed on the farm.  Increasing family labour would 469 
provide support for lost income or to cover the intended loss of employed labour, if 470 
supporting payments for this activity were to reduce.  Nevertheless, this effect is 471 
perhaps reflective of diverse family household structures and the response to 472 
decoupled payments in terms of withdrawing from farming operations.   473 
Other factors which influence increasing the level of employed labour are age and 474 
identification of a successor, reflecting both the more innovative approaches of 475 
younger farmers and the positive outlook of those farmers who have assurance that 476 
their farm will continue after retirement (Lobley and Potter, 2004).  Decreasing the 477 
level of employed labour is driven by increasing age, which may relate to a running 478 
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down of farming production in older farmers without successors (Potter and Lobley, 479 
1992).  480 
 481 
With respect to land rented in or out, changing Pillar 1 payments has an effect.  If 482 
payments increased then farmers would have a higher propensity to rent in more 483 
land and this could be reflective of increasing optimism within farming that these 484 
higher levels of subsidies may realise.  Alternatively, more land could be rented out.  485 
This latter decision may be reflective of withdrawal for maintaining the stricter 486 
requirements proposed under greening and cross-compliance.  Bougherara and 487 
Latruffe (2010) examined intentions for land use with a sample of 80 French farmers 488 
under the 2003 CAP reforms.  They found that the probability of idling land, as well 489 
as maintaining cross-compliance conditions, were less likely to occur if the costs of 490 
conversion were seen to be high.  This may be occurring here as payment increases 491 
provides an incentive to reduce the perceived burden of management of land or the 492 
opportunity to rent out more land.  Decreasing payment rates does not seem to have 493 
an effect on land rental activity.   494 
 495 
4.0. Conclusions 496 
The general finding from previous studies of farmer intentions is the lack of desire to 497 
change farm planning trajectories. This is because farmers are locked into an asset 498 
structure which leads to high exit costs (Latruffe et al., 2013).  This asset fixity occurs 499 
where capital and labour remain within farming, even though their returns are low, 500 
due to lack of mobility and opportunity (Ackrill, 2000).  In addition, some evidence 501 
exists for the non-pecuniary benefits of agriculture which explains the desire to 502 
remain in farming from the satisfaction it brings, even when incomes are low 503 
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(Roberts and Key, 2009; Howley et al., 2015).  Thus, these offer some foundation for 504 
understanding the reluctance to exit the industry revealed by this and other studies.   505 
Aligning the path dependency model to farming intention studies offers a further 506 
conceptual basis for understanding future planning behaviours to explain the desire 507 
to increase or decrease activity.  Previous studies have tended to ignore these 508 
effects, or only alluded to the nature of their influence.  Skokstad (2010) and Viaggi 509 
et al. (2013) both included some dynamic effect in their studies of willingness to sell 510 
land after the decision to exit farming has been made.  It is clear from our study that 511 
past behaviour does explain a number of other stated agricultural intentions as well.   512 
Hence, it would seem that making past behaviours more explicit in studies of farmer 513 
intentions would be an important extension to this type of research.  In most cases, 514 
these have a stronger influence on intended behaviour than the standard socio-515 
economic and structural factors, which have been examined in previous studies (e.g. 516 
Lobley and Butler, 2010; Tranter et al., 2007). In addition, this study suggests that 517 
past behaviour can have an influence which is equal to or exceeds a change in 518 
subsidy payment on predicting future intentions.  519 
Nevertheless, the intention to change is also driven, to some extent, by these 520 
common farm structure and socio-economic variables.  The most significant indicator 521 
seems to be the identification of a successor.  Very few studies within the intentions 522 
literature account for succession directly, for instance Raggi et al. (2013) included 523 
the influence of farming household members and this could be taken as a proxy for 524 
succession.  The influence of identifying a successor is positive and mostly 525 
significant across the options tested.  Sutherland et al. (2012), in their 526 
conceptualisation of this transition process, argue that succession can be a key 527 
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‘trigger point’ for change to farming trajectories, but can also lead to a longer term 528 
continuation of an existing farm trajectory (depending on the extent to which the 529 
successor was embedded in the business prior to succession occurring). Whilst 530 
succession has been found to be strongly significant, other socio-economic 531 
variables, such as education and holding status performed less well in predicting 532 
increasing activity.   533 
The age of the farmer tends be another significant variable.  Younger farmers wish to 534 
increase production activity. This is consistent with an analysis of Eurostat figures 535 
undertaken by Zagata and Sutherland (2015), which found that young sole holders 536 
on average operate more economically efficient and productive farms. What has not 537 
been estimated is the influence of new entrants, as opposed to younger farmers, on 538 
intentions.  Gorton et al.  (2008), within their segmentation of farmers in five EU 539 
member states, found a ‘new entrants’ cluster, which was heavily populated by 540 
farmers within what were (at the time), new member states, of Lithuania and 541 
Slovakia.  This group expressed the strongest desire to expand the business, 542 
relative to other more traditional farming clusters found within their study.  Hence, it 543 
could be hypothesised that new entrants would have the same positive effect on 544 
increasing production as younger farmers.  In relation to this, the influence of 545 
inheritance of the farm tends to be nominal and, in most cases insignificant. 546 
Accordingly, new entrants and their intentions towards production may be a 547 
profitable area for further investigation.  548 
Payment changes in Pillar 1 may be seen as a trigger event to change this path 549 
dependency.  This study finds there is some effect with respect to Pillar 1 payments, 550 
which seems to infer that payments are not as decoupled as policy makers would 551 
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wish. Furthermore, for some of the intentions, such as intensity of production, the 552 
number of livestock and the level of employed labour, these are more sensitive to a 553 
reduction than an increase.  This perhaps offers a perspective on the loss aversion 554 
effect, that is, farmer behaviour is moderated through a risk perception framework 555 
whereby they are more sensitive to a loss compared to an equivalent gain. 556 
Bocqueho et al. (2014), in their study of bonuses and penalties, found a similar loss-557 
aversion effect for farmers in Eastern France. 558 
Examining farmer intentions is recognised as a contentious area, as these stated 559 
intentions under hypothetical scenarios may not ultimately lead to the identified 560 
behavioural outcomes (Viaggi et al., 2011; Latruffe et al., 2013) and this aligns with 561 
other studies which make a distinction between attitudes and behaviours (Liska, 562 
1974; Gasson, 1974; Ilbery, 1978; Kraus, 1995).   Gorton et al. (2008) contend that 563 
when intentions reflect a short time frame then there is more basis for robust 564 
evaluation of intentions. Studies with longer planning horizons may be expected to 565 
have an increased variance between stated intentions and actual behaviour.  The 566 
reform of the CAP will add another layer to decision-making uncertainties or may 567 
reflect Weber’s (1997) contention that we operate within a ‘finite pool of worry’ and 568 
the full implications of CAP reform are too distant to consider for farmer decision-569 
making.  In addition, like all surveys of future intent, the responses may have some 570 
built-in bias which would be reflective of present agricultural conditions and outlook.  571 
In Scotland, at the time of the survey, farmers were recovering from severe wet 572 
weather incidents which led to the loss of stock in more remote farming areas.  573 
Consequently, we would have expected less optimism in the responses; that is, 574 
more farmers declaring to reduce activity or exit.  That we found a high level of 575 
tenacity to remain within farming may provide evidence of the robustness of the 576 
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survey instrument in polling farmer opinions towards the future of their industry.  This 577 
relatively positive view of the future in spite of recent challenges is also consistent 578 
with Lobley and Potter’s (2004) finding, where the majority of farmers in their English 579 
study had similarly expressed strong commitments to continue to remain engaged as 580 
primary occupation farmers (i.e. the majority of their household incomes from 581 
farming) despite recent hardships.   582 
Finally, a policy goal within the UK and other countries has been the focus towards 583 
increasing the efficiency and production of food, in particular through promoting the 584 
sustainable intensification of farming (Royal Society, 2009; Marsden, 2010; 585 
Foresight, 2011). Rickard (2015) has argued that the CAP will slow down the 586 
structural change needed within the industry to meet this goal due to its focus on 587 
protecting small-scale farming viability.   We find that changes in payment rates will 588 
influence the intention to intensify and perhaps reflects a view that the payment 589 
offers leverage to invest in structural change.    590 
Overall this study, and previous studies towards farming intentions under CAP 591 
reform, places the farmer within a wider trajectory than changing CAP payments on 592 
influencing change and argues for a more dynamic approach to understanding the 593 
factors behind future intentions.  This has consequences for the ambitions of future 594 
CAP reforms and, moreover, the negotiations towards tailoring the operational 595 
requirements at a national, as oppose to an EU, level.   596 
 597 
 598 
 599 
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Table 1.  Survey respondents by NUTS2^ region classification, mean and standard deviation  
 Scottish Region n 
Standard Gross 
Margin~ (euro) 
European Size 
Unit* 
Livestock 
(No) 
Area 
(Ha) 
Eastern  295 58,976.74 41.7 141.1 393.6 
SD 
 
77,489.47 54.8 177.4 641.9 
      
Highlands & Islands 712 22,616.50 16.0 69.8 426.1 
SD 
 
34,125.30 24.1 116.0 1,937.8 
      
North Eastern  145 42,098.51 29.8 124.1 128.2 
SD 
 
65,497.28 46.3 205.3 342.0 
      
South Western  600 75,248.29 53.3 211.8 200.5 
 SD 
 
97,113.73 68.7 338.9 355.2 
^ NUTS2 is the nomenclature of EU regions 
~ Standard Gross Margin (SGM) reflects size of the enterprise and is calculated per head of livestock, using standardised SGM coefficients. 
* Measured as standard gross margin divided by 1200 Euros 
 
 
Table(s)
Table 2. Variables used within the empirical model and distributions 
Name Description Coding Distributions 
R- Response to past CAP 
reform (2005) 
Dummy variables (increase (INC) and decrease (DEC)) where the 
reference is no change  
Varies per activity 
PI- Response to payment 
increase by 25% 
Dummy variables (increase (I) and decrease (D)) where the reference is 
no change 
Varies per activity 
PD- Response to payment 
decrease by 25% 
Dummy variables (increase (I) and decrease (D)) where the reference is 
no change 
Varies per activity 
AGE Farmer age Dummy variables where the reference is age being less than 44  Less than 44 
45-64 
65+ 
16% 
58% 
27% 
EDU Education Dummy variable where the reference is school only education School only 
College 
49% 
51% 
OWN Land ownership Dummy variables where the reference is owner-occupied Owner-occupied 
Tenanted 
Mixed 
63% 
25% 
17% 
LAB Labour employed Dummy variables where the reference is no-one employed None 
1-3 persons 
3+ persons 
52% 
41% 
7% 
REG Region Dummy variables where the reference is North East region North East 
South East 
South West 
North West 
11% 
14% 
43% 
33% 
AES Member of an agri-
environmental Scheme 
Dummy variable where the reference is no membership No 
Yes 
59% 
41% 
INH Whether the business 
was inherited 
Dummy variable where the reference is not inherited Not inherited 
Inherited 
36% 
64% 
SUC Whether a successor has 
been identified 
Dummy variable where the reference is no successor identified Not identified 
Identified 
51%; 
49% 
LFA Farm in a less favoured 
area (LFA) 
Dummy variable where the reference is no land in LFA No LFA 
LFA 
28% 
72% 
DAIRY Farm is a specialised 
dairy farm 
Dummy variable where the reference is not a specialised dairy farm Not specialised 
Specialised 
90% 
10% 
 
Table 3.  Sensitivities of response to payment scenarios relative to Business as Usual, percentage by intention if a) Pillar 1 payments 
increase by 25% or b) Pillar 1 payments decrease by 25% 
a) PINC -BAU b) PDEC - BAU
Stay Same Increase Decrease Stay Same Increase Decrease 
The intensity of production -6.0 13.0 -7.0 -16.8 -18.8 35.5 
The number of livestock -6.7 14.7 -8.9 -14.5 -24.7 38.3 
The size of the business -24.0 28.9 -4.9 -14.2 1.6 12.6 
The level of employed labour -3.1 14.6 -3.7 -10.1 -11.3 29.2 
The  amount of family labour 4.8 -0.9 -2.8 -3.8 -10.5 15.5 
The amount of land rented or contracted 6.5 6.4 -2.0 -3.7 -3.4 18.0 
Sell the Business -4.0 5.6 
BAU:  Business as usual conditions, where present economic conditions and pillar 1 annual payments remain at 2013 levels 
PINC:  Business as usual conditions, where present economic conditions stay the same, but pillar 1 annual payments increase by 25% on 2013 levels 
PDEC: Business as usual conditions, where present economic conditions stay the same, but pillar 1 annual payments decrease by 25% on 2013 levels 
Table 4. Logistic regression model on intention to exit farming, relative risk ratios 
 Intention to exit farming 
PAYMENT DECREASE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE) 4.26
***
 (1.28) 
  
  AGE (REFERENCE CLASS : <44)  
  45-64 5.87
*
 (4.32) 
65+ 15.35
***
 (11.53) 
EDUCATION 
0.96 (0.26) 
MANAGEMENT STATUS (REFERENCE CLASS : OWNER) 
  Tenanted 0.58 (0.20) 
Mixed 0.99 (0.37) 
LABOUR EMPLOYED (REFERENCE CLASS : NONE)  
  1-3 persons  0.95 (0.27) 
> 3 persons 1.09 (0.65) 
REGION (REFERENCE CLASS : NORTH EAST) 
  North West  1.24 (0.62) 
South East  2.28 (1.21) 
South West 1.88 (0.89) 
AES MEMBER 0.65 (0.18) 
INHERITED 0.89 (0.24) 
SUCCESOR 0.17
***
 (0.05) 
LFA 1.22 (0.46) 
DAIRY 1.31 (0.72) 
  
  Percent concordant  96% 
-2 log likelihood  -252.3 
Likelihood ratio (LR)  
 
96.50
*** 
McFadden's R
2
:  0.161 
Nagelkerke’s R
2
   0.184 
Cox and Snell R
2
  0.053 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression model on agricultural intentions by 2020, 
relative risk ratios 
 The size of the agricultural 
enterprise 
The intensity of production The number of livestock 
 Increase
*
 Decrease
^
 Increase
*
 Decrease
^
 Increase
*
 Decrease
^
 
PAST RESPONSE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE)      
RDec 0.9 (0.3) 0.3
***
 (0.1) 1.3 (0.3) 3.9
***
 (0.9) 1.4 (0.3) 3.6
***
 (0.8) 
Rinc 2.8
***
 (0.8) 0.6 (0.2) 3.4
***
 (0.6) 1.3 (0.3) 3.2
***
 (0.5) 1.6 (0.4) 
PAYMENT INCREASE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE) 
  
  
PI-D 1.7 (1.8) 0.5 (0.4) 0.8 (0.5) 4.8
***
 (1.8) 0.6 (0.4) 3.1
**
 (1.2) 
PI-I 4.6 (4.9) 0.3 (0.3) 3.7
***
 (0.6) 1.0 (0.2) 4.3
***
 (0.7) 1.1 (0.2) 
PAYMENT DECREASE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE) 
  
  
PD-D 1.1 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2) 0.7* (0.1) 2.2
***
 (0.4) 0.7
**
 (0.1) 1.9
**
 (0.4) 
PD-I 0.6
*
 (0.1) 1.0 (0.4) 1.6 (0.5) 1.4 (0.6) 1.4 (0.5) 1.1 (0.6) 
AGE (REFERENCE CLASS : <44)    
  
  
45-64 0.5
***
 (0.1) 1.8 (0.7) 0.7 (0.1) 1.9 (0.7) 0.4
***
 (0.1) 1.8 (0.7) 
65+ 0.3
***
 (0.1) 1.4 (0.7) 0.5
*
 (0.1) 3.0
**
 (1.2) 0.2
***
 (0.1) 2.3
*
 (0.9) 
EDUC 1.2 (0.1) 0.9 (0.2) 1.5
**
 (0.2) 1.3 (0.2) 1.8
***
 (0.3) 1.4 (0.3) 
MANAGEMENT STATUS (REFERENCE CLASS : OWNER)  
  
  
Ten 0.7 (0.1) 0.9 (0.2) 0.7 (0.1) 0.9 (0.2) 0.8 (0.1) 0.9 (0.2) 
Mix 0.9 (0.2) 1.8
*
 (0.5) 1.2 (0.3) 1.5 (0.4) 1.1 (0.2) 1.6 (0.4) 
LABOUR EMPLOYED (REFERENCE CLASS : NONE)  
  
  
1-3   1.3 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2) 1.4
*
 (0.2) 0.7 (0.1) 1.4 (0.2) 0.9 (0.2) 
> 3 2.0
**
 (0.5) 0.5 (0.3) 1.4 (0.4) 1.2 (0.4) 0.8 (0.2) 0.9 (0.4) 
REGION (REFERENCE CLASS : NORTH EAST)   
  
  
NW  0.7 (0.2) 1.2 (0.5) 0.9 (0.3) 1.3 (0.4) 0.9 (0.2) 1.1 (0.4) 
SE  0.9 (0.2) 1.1 (0.5) 1.3 (0.4) 0.9 (0.4) 1.3 (0.4) 0.9 (0.4) 
SW 0.9 (0.2) 1.1 (0.4) 0.8 (0.2) 1.3 (0.4) 1.0 (0.3) 1.3 (0.4) 
AES 1.1 (0.2) 1.4 (0.3) 0.9 (0.1) 0.9 (0.1) 0.9 (0.1) 1.1 (0.2) 
INH 1.2 (0.2) 1.2 (0.3) 1.0 (0.2) 0.9 (0.2) 0.8 (0.1) 0.8 (0.2) 
SUCC 2.1
***
 (0.3) 0.7 (0.2) 1.9
***
 (0.3) 0.4
***
 (0.1) 1.9
***
 (0.3) 0.6
**
 (0.1) 
LFA 1.5 (0.3) 2.9
*
 (1.4) 0.9 (0.3) 4.1
*
 (2.6) 0.6 (0.2) 3.2 (2.0) 
DAIRY 2.3** (0.7) 2.6 (1.6) 1.6 (0.6) 3.6 (2.7) 0.9 (0.3) 2.8 (2.0) 
Percent concordant  74.6% 66.7% 64.1% 
-2 log likelihood -1102.53 -1171.18 -1261.99 
Likelihood ratio (LR)  378.16
*** 
499.35
***
 533.59
***
 
McFadden's R
2
: 0.146 0.176 0.175 
Nagelkerke’s R
2
  0.251 0.350 0.362 
Cox and Snell R
2
 0.194 0.306 0.323 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
* Intentions to increase activity by 2020 relative to no intended change 
^ Intentions to decrease activity by 2020 relative to no intended change 
 
  
Table 6. Multinomial logistic regression model on land and labour intentions by 2020, 
relative risk ratios 
  Employed labour Family labour Land  
 Increase
*
 Decrease
^
 Increase
*
 Decrease
^
 Contracted In
*
 Rented Out
^
 
PAST RESPONSE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE)      
RDec 2.1
*
 (0.6) 6.0
***
 (2.2) 1.8 (0.7) 3.8
**
 (1.6) 4.2
***
 (1.7) 11.1
***
 (6.2) 
Rinc 2.1
**
 (0.4) 4.0
***
 (1.5) 3.7
***
 (0.8) 2.1
*
 (0.8) 5.1
***
 (1.3) 5.6
***
 (2.3) 
PAYMENT INCREASE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE)  
  
  
PI-D 0.9 (0.9) 2.3 (1.9) 1.9 (1.4) 7.1
**
 (4.5) 0.6 (0.6) 3.6
***
 (2.3) 
PI-I 4.2
***
 (0.9) 1.1 (0.3) 6.5
***
 (1.4) 2.0 (0.7) 6.8
***
 (1.7) 0.8 (0.4) 
PAYMENT DECREASE (REFERENCE CLASS : NO CHANGE)  
  
  
PD-D 1.4 (0.2) 3.2
***
 (0.9) 1.1 (0.3) 2.9
***
 (0.9) 1.3 (0.3) 1.2 (0.5) 
PD-I 2.1
***
 (1.7) 8.9 (10.3) 7.3
***
 (3.1) 4.0* (2.7) 1.1 (0.6) 1.7 (1.1) 
AGE (REFERENCE CLASS : <44)   
  
  
45-64 0.5
**
 (0.1) 1.9 (0.9) 0.8 (0.2) 0.8 (0.3) 0.6 (0.2) 3.6 (2.0) 
65+ 0.2
***
 (0.1) 3.2
*
 (1.7) 0.5* (0.2) 0.9 (0.5) 0.4 (0.2) 5.8
*
 (4.1) 
EDUC 1.2 (0.3) 1.2 (0.3) 1.1 (0.2) 1.2 (0.3) 1.2 (0.3) 0.6 (0.2) 
MANAGEMENT STATUS (REFERENCE CLASS : 
OWNER) 
  
  
  
Ten 0.7 (0.2) 1.4 (0.5) 1.0 (0.2) 1.2 (0.4) 0.7 (0.2) 1.8 (0.8) 
Mix 0.9 (0.3) 1.8 (0.7) 0.7 (0.2) 0.7 (0.3) 0.6 (0.2) 1.3 (0.6) 
LABOUR EMPLOYED (REFERENCE CLASS : NONE)   
  
  
1-3   0.9 (0.2) 1.0 (0.3) 0.9 (0.2) 1.0 (0.3) 1.0 (0.3) 1.3 (0.5) 
> 3 0.6 (0.2) 1.1 (0.6) 1.2 (0.4) 1.5 (0.8) 1.9 (0.8) 0.8 (0.6) 
REGION (REFERENCE CLASS : NORTH EAST)   
  
  
NW  1.3 (0.5) 0.9 (0.5) 1.1 (0.4) 3.2 (2.5) 0.6 (0.3) 1.8 (1.2) 
SE  1.1 (0.5) 0.6 (0.4) 1.5 (0.6) 2.0 (1.7) 0.8 (0.3) 1.3 (1.0) 
SW 1.6 (0.6) 1.4 (0.7) 1.6 (0.6) 4.4 (3.3) 0.8 (0.3) 2.2 (1.4) 
AES 1.2 (0.2) 0.9 (0.3) 1.2 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2) 1.5 (0.4) 0.5 (0.2) 
INH 1.0 (0.2) 0.5
*
 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2) 0.8 (0.3) 1.1 (0.3) 0.9 (0.3) 
SUCC 1.7
*
 (0.3) 0.4
**
 (0.1) 1.3 (0.3) 0.4
**
 (0.1) 1.2 (0.3) 0.4
**
 (0.1) 
LFA 0.9 (0.5) 3.5 (3.7) 0.9 (0.4) 1.2 (0.9) 0.4
*
 (0.2) 1.0 (0.7) 
DAIRY 2.1 (1.1) 5.5 (6.0) 0.6 (0.3) 1.2 (1.0) 0.5 (0.3) 1.2 (1.1) 
          
Percent concordant 70.83% 76.97% 71.71% 
-2 log likelihood -1070.13 -957.68 -993.59 
Likelihood ratio (LR)  380.55*** 333.86*** 388.02*** 
McFadden's R
2
: 0.151 0.148 0.163 
Nagelkerke’s R
2
  0.289 0.268 0.300 
Cox and Snell R
2
 0.243 0.217 0.247 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
* Intentions to increase activity by 2020 relative to no intended change 
^ Intentions to decrease activity by 2020 relative to no intended change 
 
 
Figure 1.  Sensitivities of change to payment scenarios, percentage sum by intention 
if a) Pillar 1 payments remain the same, b) Pillar 1 payments increase by 25%, c) Pillar 
1 payments decrease by 25% 
 
* BAU:  Business as usual conditions, where present economic conditions and pillar 1 annual 
payments remain at 2013 levels 
^ PINC:  Business as usual conditions, where present economic conditions stay the same, but pillar 1 
annual payments increase by 25% on 2013 levels 
~ PDEC: Business as usual conditions, where present economic conditions stay the same, but pillar 1 
annual payments decrease by 25% on 2013 levels 
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